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In the Stipreme Court of the
State of lJtah

JOSEPH M. PERKINS,),
ESTHER J. PERKINS,
Plaintiffs, ,
vs.
\
(
)
RICHARD L. SPENCER,
GRACE N. SPENCER,
Defendants.

CASE
NO. 7565

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court of the State
of Utah, Han. W. Stanley Dunford, Judge.

PETER M. LOWE,
RICHARD M. TAYLOR,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
------------------------ ______, ----------Cl~r~" S~preme Court, Utah

VERN WENTZ,
Attorney for Defendants
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In the Supreme Court of the
State of lJtah

JOSEPH M. PERKINS,
ESTHER J. PERKINS,

)'
Plaintiffs,

vs.

\

RICHARD L. SPENCER,
(
)
GRACE N. SPENCER,
Defendants.

CASE
NO. 7565

J

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-respondents
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract, (attached
Exhibit "A") on or about the 26th day of May, 1949, by
which contract the defendants-respondents agreed to sell
and the plaintiffs-appellants agreed to buy certain real estate located in Provo, Utah, for the sum of $10,500.00,
payable $2,500.00 cash and $75.00 or more per month beginning June 26, 1949, with interest on deferred payments
at 5% per annum, payable monthly, with provisions that
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"monthly payments be applied first to the payment of interest, and second to reduction of principal."
The Contract (attached Exhibit "A") carries the following provision:
"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms
hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure to make any payments when the same shall become due, or within 30
days thereafter, the Seller shall ,at his option, be released from all obligations in law and equity to convey
said property, and all payments which have been made
theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the
non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees
that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter and take
possession of said premises without legal process as
in its first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and
the said additions and improvements shall remain with
the land and become the property of the Seller, the
Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller.
It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement."
During negotiations between the parties there was no
reference or discussion by either Buyer or Seller of the forfeiture clause set forth above, nor what the damage would
be in the event of breach of the Contract set forth above.
The real estate agent for the Seller selected the printed contract form, and instructed his secretary to fill in the blanks.
The Buyer paid the down payment of $2,500.00 and three
of the $75.00 per month installments, making a total paid
by them of $2,725.00. The last payment was made August
25, 1949. The Buyers failed to pay further installments,
and on November 3, 1949, the Sellers served notice that
unless the Buyers paid the delinquency within five days, the
Buyers were tenants at will of the Sellers, and would for-
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feit, as liquidated damages, all moneys paid in performance
of the Contract. No payment was made within the five
days allowed by the foregoing notice, and on November 9,
1949, the Sellers caused another notice to be prepared in
which they informed the Buyers that they were then tenants at will of the Sellers, and served Notice requiring them
to vacate the premises within five days after service of
said notice. This notice was not served personally upon
Joseph M. Perkins, and no copy was transmitted to him
through the mail. Memorandum Decision, pgs. 3, 4.
On or about the 7th day of November, 1949, the Buyers commenced an action in the District Court of Utah
County against the Sellers, seeking rescission of the aforesaid contract upon the grounds of fraud, or in the alternative, reformation of the contract upon the basis of mistake.
The Sellers, on or about the 18th day of November, 1949,
commenced an action in Unlawful Detainer against the Buyers in the City Court of Provo City. The Buyers answered
the action in the City Court of Provo City, and pleaded another action pending in the District Court of Utah County
The Sellers then answered the Buyers' complaint in the action pending in the District Court of Utah County and counter-claimed for unlawful detainer, and in the alternative,
for specific performance of the contract. The Buyers in
their reply in the action in the District Court of Utah County, defended upon the grounds that the Sellers had elected
to recover the property in question and could not obtain
specific performance. The Buyers pleaded a counterclaim
in their reply, alleging said election of remedies by the Sellers, and praying for restitution of all amounts paid by
them to Sellers, and alleging that the forfeiture provisions
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of said contract were void because they provided for a penalty and not liquidated damages.
The Court in the District Court action in Utah County
granted the Sellers a nonsuit on the Buyers' cause of action for rescission and reformation. Memorandum Decision, pg. 5. The Court also found that the Sellers had elected to rescind the contract, and were not entitled to specific
performance. Memorandum Decision, pg. 11. The Court
held the Buyer, Mrs. Esther J. Perkins, guilty of unlawful
detainer. Memorandum Decision, pg. 14. The Court further found that the forfeiture provided by the contract was
not a penalty, but was liquidated damages. Memorandum
Decision, pg. 13.
PLAINTIFFS' POINTS

1-The Court erred in assessing $532.50 damages by reason
of the unlawful detainer of the said Esther J. Perkins,
and in holding the plaintiff Esther J. Perkins guilty of
unlawful detainer.
2-The Court erred in holding the forfeiture provision of
the contract was not a penalty.
POINT ONE

The Court held that the Plaintiff, Joseph M. Perkins,
was not guilty of unlawful detainer. Perkins was at least
a tenant at will as is provided for by the Contract. see
F1orfeiture Clause). In our state, such a tenancy may not
be terminated except by the procedure set forth in the Code,
Sec. 104-60-3 (5), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and prior
to the terminating of the tenancy, the tenant has the possession and control of the premises. 35 C. J. 953. Since
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by definition, a tenant at will has the possession and control during the life of the tenancy, it would seem to follow
that the owner of the fee does not have sufficient interest
to bring unlawful detainer against anyone but the tenant.
Therefore, it would seem that Mrs. Perkins could not be
guilty of unlawful detainer so long as her husband's tenancy
at will was not terminated.
If the above argument be valid, then it follows, of
course, that the judgment for damages for unlawful detainer can not be sustained. The Court in Forrester v.
Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 P. 206, held that "damages must be
the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful
detainer and nothing more." If there be no unlawful detainer, it follows there can be no damages.
THE FAILURE OF ESTHER J. PERKINS TO MOVE
OUT OF THE HOUSE DID NOT CAUSE SPENCERS
ANY DAMAGE.
Even if there were unlawful detainer, it is difficult to
see how the Sellers were damaged. They had no right to
possession since the tenancy at will of Joseph M. Perkins
was undetermined. Any damages, therefore, would seem
to be by reason of the Sellers' failure to terminate both
joint tenancies, and not be reason of the occupancy by Mrs.
Perkins. Even if Mrs. Perkins had moved, the Sellers would
have been in the same position so far as their damages are
concerned. They still would not have had· the right to possession until they terminated her husband's tenancy, and
would not be damaged by Mrs. Perkins unless she remained
thereafter. 36 .C. J. S., p. 1159.
Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 P. 206.
Buchanan v. Crites, 160 U. 428, 150 P2d 100.
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Here we are not concerned with damages for breach of
Contract, but are considering the damages which were the
direct and natural result of Esther J. Perkins' failure to
move out of the property in question after having received
defendants' Notice to Vacate. It is respectfully submitted
that there have been no damages resulting from Esther J.
Perkins' failure to move. The defendants have lost nothing!

POINT TWO

The law in this state as to what constitutes a penalty
has undergone a distinct evolution since the first case
which considered the question. Dopp vs. Richards, 43 U.
332, 135 P. 98. The law early recognized that even though
a contract by its terms called for liquidated damages, in
fact, may provide for a penalty. Just when this is the case
may be difficult to determine, and the Courts have used
several tests.
WHERE THE DAMAGES PROVIDED FOR IN THE
AGREEMENT ARE DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE
SEVERAL COVENANTS THEREIN PROVIDED, THEY
WILL BE CONSTRUED AS A PENALTY RATHER
THAN LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
The first case to announce this test was Dopp v. Richards, 43 U. 332, 135 P. 98, where the Court was considering a forfeiture provision similar to that in the Unifonn
Real Estate Contract marked Exhibit "A". The next Utah
_ case to utilize this test was Western Macaroni Mfg. v. Fiore,
47 U. 108, 151 P. 984 (1915), where the Court said, "where
an agreement imposes several distinct duties or obligations
of different degrees of importance, and the same sum is
named as damages for the breach of either indifferently,

~

I

I

"I
I

I

•.'
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the sum is to be regarded as a penalty." This case was
cited and approved in Calambra Corp. v. Abels, (Okla.)
95 P2d 601 (1939), where the Court held a reversion clause
in a contract to be a penalty.
In the case before the Court, there are six covenants:
(1) to pay $75.00 per month; (2) to pay the balance due
when the Bountiful house is sold; (3) upon request, secure a loan upon the property; (4) pay all taxes and special improvements; (5) pay general taxes after June 1,
1949; and (6) keep all buildings insured for $8,000.00,
and assign insurance policy to Seller. The Buyer could forfeit the same amount for failure to perform any of these
Covenants. Covenant No. 1 would be broken by failure to
make one installment of $75.00, while Covenant No.2 would
b~ broken by failure to pay $8,000.00 as the balance due.
The remainder of the Covenants would all result in different damages if broken. It is obvious that these Covenants
would all result in different damages if broken, and under
the above test, the provision of the Contract is to be construed as a penalty. This Contract attempts to give the
Sellers the right to forfeit the Contract and all money paid
upon the breach of any one of the six foregoing Covenants.
ORDINARILY, IF DAMAGES ARE DIFFICULT TO
ASCERTAIN, THE PROVISION WILL BE CONSTRJUED
AS FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, AND IF THEY ARE
NOT DIFICULT TO ASCERTAIN, AS ONE FOR A PENALTY . . . . 25 C. J. S., p. 666.
What would be the measure of damages in the event
of breach of a Contract such as this one? In Dopp v. Richards, 43 U. 332, 135 P. 98, it is said:
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"We think that the. better reason and greater
weight of authority sustain the rule that under such
circumstances the measure of damage is the difference
between the value of the land at the time of breach
. . . . and the Contract price to be paid, together
with the interest on the purchase price unpaid."
The only evidence entered in this case is to the effect
that the house recovered was of the value of $10,281.00.
(See Luke Clegg's testimony, TRS.) The purchase price
was $10,500.00. This indicates a damage of $219.00. The
interest on the unpaid balance equalled about $33.00 per
month, totaling $165.00. Thus we see the total damage
by this test is equal to $384.00. Plaintiffs had paid $2,725.00.
"But where there is an absolute agreement to do
a particular act, followed by a stipulation as to damages in case of a breach, and the nature of the transaction is such that there can be no inherent difficulty
in ascertaining actual damages, and the amount named
is so excessive that it will not only make the other party whole, but form an exhorbitant and unconscionable
recovery, it will be held that the amount named should
be regarded as a penalty."
Thomas v. Foulger, 264 P. 975, 71 U. 274.
Bramwell Inc. v. Uggla, 16 P2d 913, 81 U. 85.
Davis v. U. S~, 17 Ct. Cl. 201, 215.
It is submitted that in this case there is no inherent

difficulty in ascertaining or measuring the damages incident to the breach of the Contract by the Buyers. It is
to be noticed that the forfeiture clause is entirely unilateral
in its operation.
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DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF CONTRACTS
FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ARE FIXED AND
LIQUIDATED BY LAW, AND NEITHER REQUIRE NOR
ARE SUSCEPTIBLE OF LIQUIDATION BY THE PARTES . . . . 17 C. J. p. 954.
In Truitt v. Patten, _ _ _u ___ , 287 P. 179 (1930)
and again in Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 40 P2d 198 (1935)
the Court said:
"The ordinary rules as to liquidated damages may
be said to be inapplicable to Contracts for the payment
of money only. In such cases the Courts construe the
damages.as a penalty, irrespective of the intent of the
parties or the language by which it is expressed. The
principle is that the damages for the breach of Contracts for the payment of money is fixed and liquidated by law, and neither require nor are susceptible
of liquidation by the parties, interest being the legal
measure of damages in all such cases."
In the Croft v. Jensen the Court had before it a Contract which appears to be the same as is involved in this
case. In the instant case the only covenant remaining unfulfilled by the Buyers was the Covenant to pay money and
thus it comes squarely within the above rule.
ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE, AS A BROAD
GENERAL RULE THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES
DETERMINES WHETHER A PROVISION IN A CONTRAer IS FOR A PENALTY OR FOR LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES WHICH INTENTION IS DETERMINED BY
A CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTRACT AS A WHOLE
TOGETHER WITH THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THEREOF . . . . 25 C. J. S. p. 659 .
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In this case the Court below relies upon a Utah case
which falls between Dopp v. Richards and Croft v. Jensen,
cited Supra, and the test of the "Intent of the Parties" is
applied (pp. 11, 12, 13 Memo Decision), in Cooley v. Call,
___u
, 211
977, the Court said:

P:

"The final payment was to be made December 1,
1921, or within two years and five days from the execution of the Contract. So it could readily be foreseen
by the parties to the Contract at the time it was executed just what plaintiff's damages would probably be
when the last payment became due, even if defendants
should default in every subsequent payment provided
for by the Contract. A simple mathematical calculation demonstrates that the $1,850.00 paid by the defendants amounted to at least 10 per cent per annum
on the purchase price of the property . . . . ''
"In conclusion, to avoid misunderstanding, our decision of this case is based entirely upon what we conceive to be the obvious in~ntion of the parties at the
time they executed the Contract . . . . "

(1)

(2)

In the instant case it is true that the down payment equals about 25% of the purchase price.
This fact is merely coincidental. The Court in
the above case makes no mention of this fact or
measurement and attaches no significance to it.
In this case the Plaintiffs paid down $2,500.00
and agreed to pay, and did pay for three months,
$75.00 per month. The lower Court found that
$75.00 per month is the "reasonable rental value"
of the property. Every month the defendants
were to get a reasonable return on their investment. Under these conditions it cannot be said
that the parties intended the down payment to
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provide the fund for the payment of interest or
return on investment. It would seem to indicate
exactly contrariwise.
(3)

What result do we get, if we use the mathematical
test set out in Cooley v. Call?
There the Court computed the time from
date of execution to the date of filing suit. In
this case the same period is six months. Divide
balance due into the down payment and we get
31.2%.
To get the per annum return on defendants'
investment-multiply by two. We get 62.4% return on the investment.

(4)

In Cooley v. Call, the Court was concerned about
what the parties intended by their Contract, and
they used the foregoing test to show that since
the down payment equalled only 10% per annum
return on the investment, that the parties must
have intended the down payment to be liquidated
damage .
. . "damage fairly computed
and estimated in advance."
But in this case the parties provided that
during the interim between making of the down
payment and paying the balance that the plaintiffs would pay, each month, a sum equal to the
"reasonable rental value" of the property.

(5)

The lower Court in this case has mentioned the
fact that defendants had to find another place to
live and thus the uncertainty justified the forfeiture provision in the Contract.
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(a) The first answer t~ that is that this element is not a proper element of damage. It was
not made an element or an issue of the contract
by the parties.
(b) The second answer is that the parties themselves did not consider it as an element of damage because they did not set a cert ain date for
the balance to be paid. The balance was to be
paid when the "house in Bountiful was sold."
Apparently this might be ten years later without
there being a breach of the Contract. For defendants to make the claim that they were relying on the payment of the balance appears to be
in the nature of an afterthought.
(c) The third answer is that the Sellers reserved
to themselves the right to mortgage the property
at any time to the full extent of the unpaid balance due under the Contract. It also appears
that the loan value on the property exceeded the
down payment made by defendants on their new
home. (See pp. 2 & 3, Memo Decision). Also
the monthly payments on the new house were
only about one-half of the payments to be made
by the Plaintiffs.
(6)

In this instant case the evidence reveals that
the parties did not consider nor discuss what
the damage would be in the event of a breach of
the Contract by the Buyers. (See stipulation of
counsel on reopening of case in TRS). Thus we
have no actual expressed intent of the parties.
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\VHERE IT IS DOUBTFUL
SION SHOUULD BE DEEMED
LIQUIDATEID DAMAGES, THE
REGARD IT AS A PENALTY .

\VHETHER A PROVIA PENAWY OR FOR
COURTS INCLINE TO
. . 25 C. J. S.. p. 937.

The general principle announced above has been widely
adhered to by the Courts of many states. The predominant reason given for the rule is that by "so doing, the recovery can be apportioned to the actual damages or loss
sustained." Our Utah Courts have announced the principle
and it was specifically referred to in Western Macaroni
~fg. Co. v. Fiore, 447 U. 108, 151 P. 984 (1915).
In the instant case the actual damages suffered by Defendants were very small and the sum named to be forfeited
was very large and assumes the aspects of a penalty rather
than compensation for damages suffered.
We respectfully submitted that under all of the tests
announced and applied by our Court that the forfeiture
provision in the Contract marked Exhibit "A" is a provision
for a penalty and for that reason is void.
Respectfully submitted,
PETER M. LOWE,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
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